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Abstract—A network covert channel is created that operates by modu-
lating the time between web resource accesses, with an “average web
user” read-time used as a reference. While the covert channel may be
classified as timing based, it does not operate by changing determin-
istic protocol attributes such as inter-packet delay, as do most timing
based network covert channels. Instead, our channel communicates
by modulating transaction level read-time, which in the web browsing
case has significant non-deterministic components. The channel is thus
immune to methods typically used to detect timing based network covert
channels.
1 INTRODUCTION
Network covert channels are divided into storage based and
timing based channels [12]. Storage based channels communi-
cate their illicit data by inserting it into unused packet headers,
or by modulating existing header data [6]. Timing based
channels operate by changing some aspect of the legitimate
(carrier) communication timing, such as inter-packet delay
[7]. Timing based channels have historically relied on modifi-
cation of lower level protocol timing aspects, with modulation
occurring for example at the network or transport layers (see
[10] for a recent example). Timing aspects modulated by such
channels may be quite deterministic, so detection has often
focused on statistical analysis of the carrier communication
[2] [3] [1]. The channel derived in this paper is different
than other timing channels in that it operates at a higher level
protocol: the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) as used in
web browsing. In a typical web browsing scenario, the timing
between web page accesses (web read-time) is somewhat non-
deterministic. We will take advantage of this, modulating the
read-time to send our covert message.
2 RELATED WORK
The impetus for this work comes from recent work on a
web based covert channel developed in [4] and [5]. There,
a covert channel was derived that communicated through web
resource access ordering. Web resource names were mapped
to codes, and the codes of the covert message were transmitted
by accessing the resources associated with the message codes,
in the order the codes appeared in the message. A fundamental
aspect of that channel was user timing behavior emulation. It
is unrealistic to expect a user to access web resources with
minimum or uniform delay between accesses. The channels in
[4] and [5] attempted to approximate a typical web browsing
user’s read-time by utilizing a formula provided by the Nielsen
Company [11] that associates a web page word count with
average read-time. In that channel, the average yielded by the
Nielsen formula was used as the mean for an exponential
distribution, and the read-time was taken pseudo-randomly
from that distribution. The investigation into web read-time in
[4] and [5] provided the impetus for the channel here derived,
which operates entirely by modulating web read-time.
3 USER WEB TRANSACTION BEHAVIOR
Accurate user behavior emulation involves more than simply
choosing pseudo-random values from an exponential distri-
bution. In light of more advanced research in the field [9]
[8] [13], and observation (the generated read-times in [4] and
[5] were much longer than would be expected for a typical
user), it is apparent that the method used in those papers
is overly simplistic. For example, [9] shows that web read-
times depend on many attributes of the page in question,
including not only word count but also page geometry and
keywords. That paper also demonstrates that web read-times
closely conform to Weibull distributions, of the sort used
in reliability analysis. For tractability, we will continue to
use an exponential distribution (which, notably, is a Weibull
distribution with a shape parameter of one) in the channel
developed here, though we now utilize a scaling parameter
for tuning. The reader is urged to reference [9], [8], and [13]
when developing a behaviorally accurate implementation of
the channel discussed here.
However one models average web transaction behavior, the
dynamic nature of the web makes prediction of read-time
difficult in uncontrolled environments. This is due in part to
the dynamics of user behavior, which may be largely related to
the web content. Consider for example a page consisting of a
news article. The content may be short and condensed, with a
few keywords that may aid in assessing the pages relevance to
a given user or set of users. However, many news sites include
a comments section below the main page content, which may
be very lengthy with respect to the article itself, and which may
incidentally contain any number of keywords that may confuse
a programmatic content assessment. Also, we have found, in
the course of developing our channel, that page size may
fluctuate between accesses. This is due to dynamic site content
such as advertisements (which may also change geometry and
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2keyword content of a page). Further, read-time prediction is
prohibitively difficult when the content is not primarily text
based. Pages containing videos and interactive content like
games and chat rooms possess their own read-time dynamics.
For tractability, our test implementation for the channel derived
here utilized web resources that were primarily text based, and
that included little or no dynamic content.
4 A COVERT CHANNEL BASED ON WEB PAGE
READ-TIME
Our transmitter communicates its message by altering web
read-time, with degree of deviation from a pseudo-randomized
and shared (between the transmitter and receiver) baseline
communicating the code or codes to be sent between each
set of web page accesses. System delay, the largest portion
of which is likely to be network delay, is significant in
this system. Since such delay is variable, the transmitter
and receiver share knowledge of a maximum system delay
parameter δ. Maximum system delay will probably not be
known exactly, but a safe ceiling can be agreed upon. δ should
exceed the time required for the transmitter to perform a DNS
look up, contact the remote web server, and retrieve the web
resource, in the worst expected case. As we will soon see,
there are constraints that keep us from defining δ to be too
large in our implementation, and there are benefits to using
lower values.
Along with the maximum system delay, the transmitter
and receiver share a minimum code-space delimiter α, a
scale factor s to be used in conjunction with the formulated
exponential distributions, and a Pseudo-Random Number Gen-
erator (PRNG) seed. With this information shared between the
communication endpoints, the transmitter is able to convey its
covert message to the receiver via its web read-time behavior.
4.1 Channel Transmitter
The transmitter software operates thus. A list of Uniform
Resource Locators (URLs) is formulated or retrieved. In
[4] and [5], this was done by having a daemon reside on
the transmitting user’s computer that continually monitored
network traffic, extracting URLs from the pages as the user
casually browsed the web. The transmitter seeds its PRNG
with the shared seed, ensuring that the transmitter and receiver
maintain pseudo-random variable synchronization. The trans-
mitter selects pseudo-random URLs from its list until its entire
message has been conveyed. After each web page is retrieved,
the average read-time µ is calculated using the Nielsen formula
[11], shown in Equation 1, where w is the number of relevant
words contained in the web page. Word relevance is implemen-
tation specific; in our test implementations, words that were
not HTML or JavaScript were considered relevant. Accurately
determining relevance may be difficult. For example, many
discussion posts at the bottom of a web page will significantly
alter, presumably erroneously, the time an average user may be
expected to spend on the page, should the transmitter consider
the words in these posts relevant. The average wait time µ may
be scaled as shown in Equation 2, where s is the scale factor,
which is shared between the transmitter and receiver.
µ = 0.44 · w + 25 (1)
µs = sµ (2)
In the case of page access errors such as the familiar
404 Not Found error, the transmitter waits a small amount
of time, pseudo-randomly selected between 0 and α, before
accessing the next URL. Equation 3 shows how this wait time
is calculated in our test implementation, r being a pseudo-
random number evenly distributed between zero and one, taken
from the seeded PRNG, and tr in seconds. The use of 100 to
scale r is arbitrary.
tr = (100r mod α) + δ (3)
If no error condition exists upon accessing the web resource,
a pseudo-random read-time is selected from a distribution
formulated with µs as its mean, as shown in Equation 4,
with ρ in seconds and r provided by the PRNG. The standard
deviation σ of an exponential distribution is equal to its mean.
We limit the maximum transmission time to β, introduced
in Equation 5, and measured in seconds. By this definition,
we limit our read-times to two standard deviations, shifted up
by α (read-times between 0 and α indicate an error). Read-
times may occur after β seconds, but these are reserved for
bad codes, which will be discussed below. The choice of two
standard deviations (plus α) for β in our test implementation
is largely arbitrary.
ρ = −µs · ln(1− r) (4)
β = µs + 2σ + α = 3µs + α (5)
ν is defined in Equation 6 as the total time-space around
two standard deviations of the mean, divided by the number
of codes in the code-space. Our available time window for
code transmission is divided evenly among the codes, and
ν represents the size of the resulting intervals. A number
representing a code offset from ρ is calculated as shown in
Equation 7, with Ω, and ν in seconds. The variable c represents
the code offset, 0 < c < λ. Each nu seconds after ρ delineates
a time interval representing a new code. There are λ codes in
the code-space, so 0 <= Ω <= ν · (λ− 1).
ν =
β − α
λ
=
3µs
λ
(6)
Ω = c · ν (7)
The final read-time is calculated as shown in Equation 8,
with τ in seconds. Note that a modulo occurs that wraps suffi-
ciently high codes around to the beginning of the time-space,
so the codes are split above and below ρ. The transmitter will
wait τ seconds before accessing another URL. The final read-
time τ allows the receiver to decode the the sent message
character. The transmitter will repeat this process until its
entire message has been sent. For messages i codes long, the
3Fig. 1: Visualization of System Time Domain. Each interval (delineated by vertical lines) is δ seconds.
transmitter will access i web resources in order to convey its
message.
τ = ((ρ− α+ Ω) mod (3µs)) + α (8)
A bad code exists when ρ > β (the proposed read-time
is outside of two standard deviations above the mean, shifted
up by α), or ν < δ (the size of code time slots is less than
the maximum system delay.) In the case of a bad code, the
transmitter waits some time above β. This extended read-
time allows the receiver to easily identify bad codes, and
ignore them. The time that the transmitter waits in such cases
may be constrained by an upper bound, identified as z in
our transmitter pseudo-code, which is Algorithm 1. The time
domain of our channel is shown visually in Figure 1.
4.2 Channel Receiver
The receiver must recover the covert message from the trans-
mitter’s read-time behavior. As in other network covert chan-
nels, the receiver is assumed to have access to the transmitter
communications in which the channel data is contained. How
this is done is scenario dependent; see [5] and [7] for some
examples. The receiver PRNG has been seeded with the same
seed as the transmitter’s, and it is assumed to be aware of the
transmitter’s read-times (each being τ for a resource access),
and the word count of the pages the transmitter has accessed.
With the PRNG seeded, the receiver can synchronize pseudo-
random numbers with the transmitter, though it must remem-
ber that the transmitter might use its PRNG for purposes other
than deriving ρ and compensate for this. In our implementation
the transmitter uses its PRNG to select pseudo-random URLs
from its URL list; the receiver has been constructed with this
in mind.
Having τ and w for each page the transmitter has accessed,
r in synchronization with the transmitter, and the pre-shared
values α and δ, the receiver can derive µ, σ, ρ, β, and ν the
same way as the transmitter. Recovering the message codes is
then possible. The receiver pseudo-code is shown as Algorithm
2.
4.3 Experimental Implementation
In a test environment, we were able to transmit messages of
varying length using the parameters α = 30 seconds, s = 1/4,
α = 30 seconds, δ = 7 seconds, and λ = 32 bytes. The
maximum message length tested was 14 codes. The transmitter
and receiver PRNGs were re-seeded at the beginning of each
test. The transmit URL list was specially selected to avoid
interactive and dynamic content.
The receiver was positioned on the same network as the
transmitter in such a way that it could observe the transmitter’s
HTTP traffic, and capture it using tcpdump. The tcpdump
output was used by the receiver script to recover the covert
messages. The transmitter and receiver software were both
written in Python.
4.4 Error and Data-rates
Without specific knowledge about both the pseudo-random
numbers that will be provided by the PRNG and the word
count of the web pages that will be retrieved in the course of
transmitting the message, it is prohibitively difficult to model
the data-rate of our channel. We can however arrive at some
constraints that relate to the channel’s data and error-rates.
First, a web resource retrieval will generate a bad code if
µs <
λδ
3 , so the mean read-time for a page must be above
a threshold in order for the channel to communicate a code.
If a large number of URLs accessed by the transmitter have
too low of a low word count, the channel error-rate will be
high and its data-rate will decrease. A bad code also occurs
when ρ > β, which happens with certain combinations of µs
and r. One should keep in mind that the code-space size λ
4Algorithm 1 Covert Channel Transmitter
1: function TRANSMIT(ARRAY msg)
2: D ← URL list . E.g. from file
3: i← 0
4: seed PRNG . Seed shared with rcvr
5: while i ≤ length(msg) do
6: r ← random()
7: w ← words(D[random])
8: if w = 0 then . Indicates 404 or other error
9: sleep(δ < t < α) . Sleep t in reserved zone
10: continue
11: end if
12: µs ← s(0.44w + 25)
13: σ ← µs
14: ρ← −µs ln(1− r)
15: β ← µs + 2 · σ + α
16: c← msg[i]
17: ν ← (β − α)/λ
18: if ν < δ or ρ > β then . Bad code
19: sleep(β + ((100r) mod z)
20: continue
21: end if
22: Ω← c · ν
23: τ ← ((ρ− α+ Ω) mod (β − α)) + α
24: i← i+ 1
25: if i ≤ length(msg) then
26: sleep(τ )
27: end if
28: end while
29: end function
and the maximum system delay δ have a direct effect on the
error-rate, and not to set these parameters too high.
Errors notwithstanding, channel data-rate is proportional to
δ, the scale factor s, and is dependent on the pseudo-random
numbers and page word counts encountered by the transmitter,
as well as the message codes. δ and s are to some degree
controlled by the user. While it is necessary to hold δ high
enough so that system latency will not occasionally overtake
it, resulting in bad codes and wasted read-time, it is inefficient
to set it too high, as the probability of bad codes increases with
δ. Likewise, the scale factor should operate to assist in user
behavior emulation, though setting it too low will increase the
frequency of bad codes and decrease the channel data-rate.
5 COMMENTS AND FUTURE WORK
A significant challenge to our covert channel is the accurate
emulation of user behavior (in terms of URL access ordering),
a weakness also mentioned in [4] and [5]. Users do not
typically resources randomly, with no connection between hy-
perlink structure and subject matter. A secure implementation
of our channel should approximate natural resource ordering
Algorithm 2 Covert Channel Receiver
1: function RECEIVE()
2: D ← URL list . E.g. from file, includes times
3: i← 0
4: seed PRNG . Seed shared with receiver
5: while i < length(D) do
6: r ←random()
7: w ← words(D[i])
8: µs ← s(0.44w + 25)
9: if i < length(D)−1 then
10: τ ←time(D[i+ 1−time(D[i])
11: end if
12: if w = 0 then . Indicates 404 or other error
13: i← i+ 1
14: r ← random() . Due to site selection
15: continue
16: end if
17: σ ← µs
18: ρ← −µs · ln(1− r)
19: β ← µs + 2 · σ + α
20: ν ← (β − α)/λ
21: if ν < δ or ρ > β then . Bad code
22: i← i+ 1
23: r ←random()
24: continue
25: end if
26: if abs(τ − ρ) < δ then . Absolute value function
27: Ω← 0
28: end if
29: if τ > ρ then
30: Ω← τ − ρ
31: end if
32: if τ < ρ then
33: Ω← (β − ρ) + (τ − α)
34: end if
35: c←floor(Ω/δ) . Next message code
36: i← i+ 1
37: r ←random()
38: end while
39: end function
behavior. One way such a system may be implemented is
discussed in [5]. There, it is suggested that the transmitter
query a search engine with terms, then follow the top level
result pages, traversing the resulting link structure coherently
and semi-naturally. Challenges remain, however. For example,
our test implementation spent a significant amount of read-
time on a Terms of Use page it found on the web, which is
presumably not typical user browsing behavior.
We reiterate that our read-time generation model is not
accurate, and those who are interested in generating more
accurate read-times should see [9], [8], and [13].
In [4] and [5], two codes were sent per web page access,
increasing the data-rate of the channel significantly. Presum-
5ably, such an improvement could be made to this channel as
well, though as we have seen, increasing the number of codes
in the channel’s code-space results in further division of the
available time-space, which increases the probability of a bad
code (ν < δ).
The code-space about ρ should be randomized in practice.
If a message consists primarily of high or low codes, our
implementation would spend most of its read-time above or
below ρ, which may increase the detectability of the channel.
6 CONCLUSION
We have created a network covert channel that transmits its
message by modulating web resource read-time. The chan-
nel utilizes a shared PRNG seed along with knowledge of
“average” user read-time for a web page to formulate a
base read-time. Deviance from this base is used to convey
the message codes. Our tests have shown that the channel
is functional given certain combinations of parameters. This
work is preliminary, and there is potential for extensibility in
terms of both data-rate and security.
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